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Kant rarely frames his discussions of God, faith, and religion in 
terms that explicitly focus on questions about the structure, use and 
limits of religious language, matters that have come to be of major 
concern to later philosophers of religion. His relative neglect of 
questions of religious language is hardly surprising, however, when 
placed in relation, first, to the leading question that provides impetus 
to the one major treatise on religion, Religion Within the Boundaries of 
Mere Reason, that he published as part of his critical philosophy, and 
second, to the surrounding intellectual contexts within which he 
produced the range of texts that taken together constitute his 
philosophical account of religion. Yet even though these factors limit 
the explicit attention he pays to language as it functions in religious 
belief and practice, his discussions nonetheless point to the possibility 
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of articulating distinctively Kantian modes of engaging questions about 
the forms and uses of religious language. 
 
This essay will explore one of these modes: it is one that, I shall 
argue, brings to bear on questions of religious language a fundamental 
concern that shapes Kant’s larger account of religion within his critical 
project. This concern is to locate the function of religion, understood in 
terms of humanity’s moral construal of its relation to God, within the 
distinctive vocation to which Kant sees humanity called in view of its 
unique status as the juncture of nature and freedom: to recognize, to 
respect, and to live in accord with the limits and the ends of the finite 
reason with which it engages the cosmos. As Kant articulates this 
vocation, it is one that humanity can fulfill only within the concrete 
workings of culture, society, and history by efforts to bring about the 
social conditions that make attainment of “the highest good” possible; 
chief among the conditions for attaining such good is a world order 
that makes possible an enduring peace among nations. In 
consequence, I will propose that, within the context of Kant’s 
understanding of humanity’s moral vocation, an account of the 
language humans use to speak of God and their relation to God 
requires articulating the bearing of that language upon the task of 
securing lasting peace that Kant sees morally incumbent upon all 
humanity. 
 
Hope: Making Human Space for Speaking of God 
 
Kant does not frame the main question at issue in Religion, 
“What is then the result of this right conduct of ours?” as one that 
arises directly out of human religious belief and practice.1 He sees 
it rising, instead, from the exigencies of the exercise of human moral 
reason as its scope and function had been critically elucidated in the 
Critique of Pure Reason and the Critique of Practical Reason.2 To the 
extent that Kant’s main concern in Religion focuses upon the 
conditions—both personal and social—that sustain a lifetime of 
conscientious human moral conduct and bring it to its due conclusion, 
his text often shows far more interest in delimiting what we may 
properly say about the structural features of the moral deliberation 
that guides human action than with what humans may properly say 
NOT THE PUBLISHED VERSION; this is the author’s final, peer-reviewed manuscript. The published version may be 
accessed by following the link in the citation at the bottom of the page. 
The Linguistic Dimension of Kant’s Thought, (2014): pg. 154-173. Publisher link. This article is © Northwestern University 
Press and permission has been granted for this version to appear in e-Publications@Marquette. Northwestern University 
Press does not grant permission for this article to be further copied/distributed or hosted elsewhere without the express 
permission from Northwestern University Press. 
3 
 
about God. Yet it is not only this internal conceptual structure of 
Religion that deflects his attention from questions of language. At the 
time Kant wrote this work, not only was philosophy of religion in a 
nascent state as a distinct field of inquiry, but language had yet to be 
fully thematized as a central focus preoccupying philosophical 
investigation. As a result, Kant’s treatise on religion does not so much 
yield a fullfledged philosophy of religion nor does it provide a clearly 
developed account of religious language, as much as it offers a moral 
anthropology from which to situate a range of human moral conduct 
and religious phenomena within which the languages of religious belief 
and practice function. 
 
Even though questions of language do not stand front and 
center in Kant’s account of the relation in which humanity stands to 
that which it deems divine, important consequences for understanding 
the function and scope of the language humans use to articulate and 
respond to that relation nonetheless follow from his account. So as a 
first step in identifying and exploring those consequences, it will be 
useful to show how, even though these aspects of Kant’s context limit 
the attention he explicitly pays to language in his discussion of 
religion, his account nonetheless opens an important conceptual space 
from which to pose questions about human efforts to speak, 
respectively, of God, of humanity’s relation to God, and of the place of 
that relation in human moral endeavor. The space that his account 
opens is, as I will indicate below, delimited in terms of the hope that is 
central to the moral anthropology governing Kant’s critical philosophy, 
namely, the hope that such moral conduct will be effective for securing 
humanity’s “highest good.” Once this space of hope has been marked 
out as the locus from which it is proper for humans to speak of God 
and of humanity’s relation to God, we can then turn, in the following 
section, to the task of identifying within that space those elements of 
Kant’s account that, two centuries later, continue to have import for 
philosophical inquiries into the scope, shape, and function of religious 
language. 
 
In seeking to gain this purchase upon questions of religious 
language within the larger ambit of Kant’s treatment of religion, it is 
important to recognize that Kant did not construct his treatments of 
God, faith, and religion as a “philosophy of religion” as that term now 
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applies to a particular field of philosophical study. It is certainly the 
case that Kant’s pre-critical and critical discussions of the concept of 
God, as well as his articulation of “moral faith” as a distinctive element 
in his critical writings, had a formative role in what James Collins has 
called “the emergence of philosophy of religion.”3 Yet Kant dealt with 
them not as if they were elements constituting “religion” as a clearly 
focused object for philosophical inquiry but rather as matters 
embedded within his larger critical restructuring of philosophical 
inquiry, a project that did not result in—and perhaps even helped to 
preclude—his taking explicit thematic focus on language as a central 
component for his analyses of human activities, including those that 
function religiously. While throughout the course of his philosophical 
career he engaged many major issues now linked together as 
elements of philosophy of religion, his principal interest in these topics 
originally had a robust metaphysical focus typical of mid-eighteenth-
century school philosophy in Germany. His main concern in exploring 
questions about human efforts to render the divine intelligible was to 
articulate the theoretical status and function of the concept of God 
within a systematically ordered set of basic philosophical principles 
that account for the order and structure of the world. 
 
Yet as his thinking moves along the trajectory leading to the 
critical turn, the function of his discussions of God, faith, and religion 
undergoes a transformation that reorients them with respect to these 
original metaphysical concerns. He now also places them within a 
purview in which the central focus is anthropological—on articulating 
what is constitutive of humanity as the unique juncture of nature and 
freedom—and for which a crucial question is anticipatory—what hopes 
can such a uniquely constituted humanity legitimately set before itself 
in view of the limits it must critically place on the uses of the finite 
reason with which it engages nature and freedom?4 This 
anthropological focus and its anticipatory question may thus be taken 
as key coordinates that delimit the space that Kant’s account opens for 
raising questions bearing upon language—even ones that he does not 
explicitly articulate—particularly as each coordinate functions to mark 
out the space of finitude for the uniquely constituted human task to 
serve as the juncture of nature and freedom. Once within that space, 
moreover, Kant’s discussions of God, faith, and religion move in a 
direction along which questions about language, framed as what may 
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most appropriately be said—or what is better left unsaid—about God 
(as well as about how the human stands in relation to God) provide 
crucial, though sometimes only peripherally discerned, markers for 
properly delimiting the shape of the human and the horizon of its 
hope. In moving along this direction, Kant’s discussions open up 
possibilities for construing religious language as a grammar of hope 
within the space of human finitude, possibilities that will be 
explored in more detail in the next section. 
 
Even as Kant’s work gave impetus to the development of 
philosophy of religion as a distinctive field of philosophical inquiry, a 
concern with language as a defining locus for philosophical inquiry that 
would later bring about a full-fledged “linguistic turn” had started to 
take shape in the work of some of Kant’s contemporaries, most 
notably Herder.5 While this concern did not push language to the 
forefront of Kant’s program of inquiry, questions of language—framed 
in terms of some traditional metaphysical issues about God—still 
bubble up through the inchoate eddying of philosophy of religion within 
his critical project. He displays attention to language in dealing with 
certain dimensions of the concept of God, most notably regarding the 
terms or attributes that may or may not properly be predicated of God 
metaphysically understood as ens realissimum. Such focus upon what 
may be said (and not said) about God has a long philosophical and 
theological pedigree, but even engagement with that element of the 
tradition does not result in his paying sustained attention—as some 
within that tradition had occasionally done—to ways in which these 
questions bring to light a complex interplay between metaphysics and 
grammar.6 On the evidence of the lecture notes from his teaching, 
Kant’s treatment of the conceptual lineaments of many of the specific 
attributes that had been standard loci in discussion for “rational 
theology” (or a “natural theology”), construed as that branch of 
metaphysics concerned with the infinite being of God, is often not 
notably different from that proposed in the rationalist and scholastic 
traditions represented in the textbook by Baumgarten that he regularly 
used.7 
 
The key differences from this prior tradition that arise in Kant’s 
discussions thus do not principally bear upon matters of conceptual 
detail regarding what may properly be said or not said of God in 
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consequence of thinking God metaphysically—as Kant thinks human 
reason will unavoidably do—in terms of concepts such as ens 
realissimum. The interpretive attention that has long been paid to 
Kant’s criticisms of what had become the standard arguments 
advanced as proofs of the existence of a metaphysically conceived God 
has tended to overshadow the fact that there are other dimensions of 
human efforts to “think God” that Kant considers important for 
his critical project even though, by his account, all speculative efforts 
to prove the existence of God falter. The importance of these other 
dimensions, in fact, becomes all the greater for Kant’s purposes in 
light of the failure of the speculative proofs. Kant takes it to be the 
case—and of significance—that even after the exercise of human 
reason is kept within the critical limits ruling out the legitimacy of 
efforts to construct a theoretical proof of the existence of God, reason 
still will not be dissuaded from thinking God in metaphysical terms. So 
rather than trying to prevent us from thinking in a way so embedded 
in the inner dynamic of reason’s drive to comprehensive intelligibility 
that he calls it a “natural disposition,”8 Kant’s strategy for keeping 
such thinking within the limits of finite reason is to reorient it toward 
the practical (moral) end he considers primary for the uses of human 
reason. This reorientation is most famously signaled in the claim he 
puts forth in the “Preface” to the second edition of the Critique of Pure 
Reason, “Thus I had to deny knowledge in order to make room for 
faith.”9 As a result, he provides a moral reading of the function and 
import of human efforts to “think” God, particularly in terms of what 
he calls, in the Critique of Pure Reason, the “transcendental Ideal.” 
Kant’s moral reading of these human efforts to “think God” will thus be 
particularly pertinent to developing an account of religious language 
keyed to the anthropological concerns central to shaping his critical 
project.  
 
Kant’s proposal to reorient human efforts to “think” God” along 
a moral trajectory also adhere, at least implicitly, to a principle long 
operative in theological discourse that, in whatever we may try to say 
of God, the apophatic has priority over the kataphatic, that is, in 
human efforts to speak of God, we speak more truly of what God is 
not, than we do of what God is. In Kant’s case this principle functions 
in the care he uses, in his lectures as well as in his critical texts, to 
distinguish what can legitimately be said with respect to the concept of 
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God from what may be affirmed of God. With regard to the latter, Kant 
clearly stands on the side of the apophaticism of a negative theology 
that severely constrains what we may say of God. The Kantian 
constraints are severe: we may not even say—as a claim adduced 
from theoretical considerations—“God exists,” and, as a claim adduced 
on moral grounds, neither may we say “It is morally certain that there 
is a God,” though we may, on those moral grounds, say “I am morally 
certain that there is a God.”10 With regard to the former—what may 
legitimately be said of the concept of God—the constraints are also 
stringent, but unlike those placed on a theoretically proposed claim 
about God, need not render us speechless: we may properly say of the 
concept of God those things that render it suitable for regulative use 
by human reason with respect to the proper end set before humanity 
as the unique juncture of freedom and nature. While this may not at 
first seem like much, the task that Kant sees set before humanity as 
its proper concrete end—the attainment of an order of enduring peace 
for the worldwide human community—will provide ample space for 
speaking in accord with the grammar of hope that he takes to be the 
proper form in which humans may speak truly of God. 
 
What then marks out Kant’s views as distinctive with respect to 
the tradition he inherited, engaged, and helped to alter profoundly is 
the practical (moral) significance he attributed to reason’s 
authorization of speech—or of silence—in human discourse about God 
and about humanity’s relation to God. The prime import of such an 
authorization that issues from a critically chastened reason aware of 
its limits has less to do with any positive knowledge of God that it 
might yield, and far more to do with the power such authorization has 
for orienting us rightly towards the articulation and the attainment of 
the hope that is proper to our unique human status as the finite 
juncture of nature and freedom. In keeping with Kant’s affirmation of 
the primacy of the practical use of reason, what we do morally by 
virtue of our speech and our silence about God provides the most 
fundamental marker of the propriety, meaning, and truth of such 
speech and such silence. This practical test, moreover, applies to more 
than just what we do as individual agents. Since Kant construes the 
social arena of human culture, politics, and history as the concrete 
locus within which the attainment of this hope moves forward, the 
manner in which we articulate our mutual human capacity and 
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responsibility for enacting such hope together within our human social 
space will also serve as a crucial marker for our speaking properly of 
God and of the human relation to God. In consequence, the grammar 
of hope in accord with which we may speak properly of God that is 
implicit in Kant’s account of religion may be appropriately construed as 
a grammar of social hope. 
 
Finite Reason: Hope as Apophatic Grammar of 
God 
 
The discussion in the preceding section suggests at least three 
coordinates from which the account of the function and the scope of 
human finite reason that issues from Kant’s critical philosophy may be 
brought to bear on questions about the structure, use, and limits of 
religious language. The first is a theoretical apophaticism regarding 
what may be said “of God” that is framed in recognition of the limits 
that the finitude of human reason places upon the dynamic of 
intelligibility that drives efforts to articulate a concept of God. The 
second is an anthropology of finite reason that differentiates as 
theoretical and practical the uses of reason by which humanity 
engages the world in which it finds itself placed and that assigns 
primacy to reason’s practical (moral) use in this human engagement 
with the world. To the extent that Kant understands the practical use 
of reason to be the exercise of human freedom, his anthropology of 
finite reason is even more so an anthropology of human finite 
freedom. The third is the social hope that human reason frames as the 
focus for its moral engagement with the world, a hope that opens 
space for mutual discourse among us about the shape of our social 
interaction. These coordinates each play a role in delimiting the 
movement of the critical project along an anthropological trajectory 
focused upon the end that Kant sees forming the scope of the 
distinctive vocation to which humanity is called in consequence of its 
possession and exercise of finite reason: this end is to bring about, 
through exercise of that reason, the juncture of nature and freedom. 
On Kant’s account, human finite reason brings to nature—that is, to 
the world as it “is”—the demand that it be shaped to accord with 
freedom—that is, that it be re-formed into the world as it “ought to 
be.”11 In consequence, shaping human action so that it makes it 
possible for nature to accord with freedom—that is, so that it closes 
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the gap between “ought” and “is”—constitutes the fundamental human 
moral task. 
 
Questions about the structure, use, and limits of religious 
language may thus be articulated along this anthropological trajectory 
of the critical project by locating them with respect to these 
coordinates as they each bear upon the distinctively human moral 
vocation to serve as the junction of nature and freedom. The first 
coordinate, which enjoins reticence in what we attempt to say of God, 
is of particular importance for delimiting the space of all our 
questioning—be it about what we say of the human and the 
anthropological or about what we say about the divine and the 
religious—as a space of human questioning. It is only in the light of 
the reticence enjoined by the first coordinate that it becomes possible 
to exercise the requisite intellectual humility needed to take accurate 
sight on the second coordinate. Kant constructs his anthropology of 
human finite reason with full attention to the fact that one 
fundamental truth we may utter about ourselves is also a negative 
one, one that first of all affirms what we are not: we must be ready 
always to acknowledge that we are not, nor ever will be, God. The 
third coordinate then reminds us that, on Kant’s account, the human 
space of our discourse and action is one for which we have the abiding 
responsibility to make into a social space, a space in which reason 
functions to hold before us, as the most fitting end for the shared 
finitude of our humanity, peace among ourselves as a possibility that 
is in our power to realize. Humanity’s moral vocation, as Kant 
understands it, is one it can fulfill only within the concrete workings of 
culture, society, and history; it will do so by efforts to bring about the 
social conditions that make attainment of “the highest good” possible. 
As we will see at the end of this discussion, it is not without 
significance for an account of religious language that the most urgent 
of these social conditions that Kant sees as incumbent for humanity to 
work for is the establishment of an international order that would 
make possible a condition of enduring peace among the peoples of the 
world. It suggests that for Kant the possibility for speaking of God in a 
manner appropriate to our humanity is a function of envisioning 
ourselves as coworkers for enacting peace. How and why this is so will 
emerge from a more detailed discussion of each of these coordinates 
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and their relation to this fundamental concrete moral task that Kant 
sees set before human reason. 
 
Kant’s theoretical apophaticism is marked by his insistence that, 
however natural it may be for us to articulate a concept of God to 
satisfy the efforts of the theoretical use of our reason to attain 
unconditioned and comprehensive intelligibility, there is nothing 
affirmative that we may say truly about God on the basis of that 
concept alone.12 Even though whatever those efforts yield as true with 
respect to the inner logic of the concept of God as the “faultless 
ideal”13 of reason—for example, that God must be conceived as ens 
originarium, ens summum, ens entium14—may also very well be true 
of God, our affirmation of any of them as true of God still cannot be 
authorized in terms of the theoretical intelligibility proper to our finite 
reason. It cannot be authorized inasmuch as it is only within the 
spatiotemporal forms of sensible intuition that such theoretical 
intelligibility yields that what we may speak of as true. Such 
authorization may not be given in the case of the concept of God, 
however, inasmuch as the inner logic of that concept requires that 
whatever it may name or refers to not stand under conditions of 
sensible intuition: any speaking of God is a speaking of that for which 
sensible intuition may not function as frame for its intelligibility—a 
circumstance that leaves the theoretical use of our own human reason 
without proper purchase for affirming that concept as “true” of some 
“thing” (i.e., an item of the kind Kant calls “phenomenon”) or of 
“something” (i.e., that in-principle-unknowable “x” Kant calls 
“noumenon”).15 Such apophaticism, however, does not render us 
totally speechless, for it does allow us to utter at least one truth, even 
though it is a truth about what God is not: God may neither be 
conceived of nor affirmed as being “of” the spatiotemporal world.16 The 
grammar of God is not a grammar of a “thing” that is “of” or “in” the 
world. 
 
The second coordinate may be termed Kant’s anthropology of 
finite reason. He sees the human place in the cosmos delimited in 
terms of the task set before finite reason to effect the juncture of 
nature and freedom, the two mutually irreducible fields—of what is and 
of what ought to be—that present themselves to us for the 
engagement of our finite reason. This task, moreover, is one that is 
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consequent upon the profound defining difference that separates us as 
human from the divine. On this point, Kant’s anthropology of finite 
reason and his theoretical apophaticism fully converge: effecting such 
a juncture is a task is enjoined upon humanity inasmuch as we are not 
God, for whom there can be no bifurcation between “freedom” and 
“nature.” Our human place—and our human task from that place—is 
delimited precisely to the extent that we recognize that we are not 
God and the consequences that recognition has for how we take up 
our moral task as humanity. As Susan Neiman observes: 
 
Of the many distinctions Kant took wisdom and sanity to depend 
upon drawing, none was deeper than the difference between 
God and all the rest of us. Kant reminds us as often as possible 
of all that God can do and we cannot. Nobody in the history of 
philosophy was more aware of the number of ways we can 
forget it. He was equally conscious of the temptation to idolatry, 
the alternative route to confusing God with other beings. Kant’s 
relentless determination to trace ways we forget our finitude 
was matched only by his awareness that such forgetting is 
natural.17 
One consequence of delimiting our humanity so that we 
appropriately attend to this all-important difference is that it mutually 
implicates how we speak of God with how we speak of ourselves as 
human. The principle of apophaticism, which restrains what we may 
say that God is in view of attending first to what we must say that God 
is not, may very well also apply to what we say of ourselves in making 
claims about our humanity. The affirmation that we are not God, that 
we are not divine, carries with it the consequence that even those few 
claims that theoretical apophaticism licenses as proper to us to say of 
the concept of God in terms of “transcendental predicates”18 may even 
more surely not be said of humanity, be it collectively or individually. 
We may not structure what we say of ourselves as human in accord 
with a grammar of the divine—which would be a grammar of idolatry—
even as our “forgetting” of the difference between the human and the 
divine impels us to encompass the divine within a grammar of the 
human—which would be a grammar of anthropomorphism and 
ontotheology. Apophaticism serves as finite reason’s mode of discipline 
upon anthropomorphism in speaking of the divine and idolatry in 
naming the non-divine as divine, both deeply rooted human impulses 
that blur the difference between the human and the divine. 
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Kant’s anthropology of finite reason thus marks off the 
difference and the distance between the human and the divine with 
respect to the concepts and the theoretical claims located within the 
ambit of a “transcendental theology” ambitioning to speak of God in 
metaphysical terms. Along this anthropological trajectory of the critical 
project, moreover, there also lies a moral difference between the 
human and the divine that has significant bearing upon the scope of 
proper speech and proper silence regarding God, humanity, and the 
relation between them that forms the space of religion. In positive 
terms, this difference is signaled by the distinction Kant makes 
between God’s “holy” will, before which there is no gap between what 
is and what ought to be, and our human wills, which we each must 
strive to form as a “good” will by efforts to shape the world as it is into 
the world as it ought to be. In negative terms, this difference is 
signaled by the presence of the “radical evil” that confronts human 
moral efforts, both individual and social, to bridge the difference 
between what is and what ought to be. Radical evil, articulated in 
Kant’s technical terminology as a reversal in the order of one’s 
(supreme) maxim for governing conduct, can be characterized as the 
moral obduracy of self-preference, a systemic program of self-
exception from the demand moral reason places on all by virtue of 
their shared humanity.19 Over against such radical evil stands the 
social hope that marks the third coordinate from which we may mark 
out the shape of the language with which we may speak of God and of 
the human relation to God in a manner proper to the limits of our finite 
reason. 
 
The difference and distance between the human and the divine 
that radical evil marks off is not identical with that marked off by the 
conceptual and metaphysical dimensions of the finitude that human 
reason encounters at the limit of its theoretical use. That we are not 
infinite, eternal, or omnipresent—none of these differences that mark 
humanity as not divinity—does not constitute the radical evil in which 
Kant takes humanity to stand; neither our “metaphysical distance” 
from the divine, nor our contingency count as radical evil. For Kant, 
finitude is not evil. Even so, radical evil issues, on Kant’s account, from 
our finitude and stands as the most potent marker of the profound 
divide we encounter between nature and freedom in the uses of our 
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finite reason. In face of this divide, human finite reason is put in 
question in ways that test the horizon of its hope that its exercise will 
not thereby come to naught: does our finite reason provide us with a 
capacity to overcome this divide so vividly marked by radical evil and, 
if so, how are we to exercise that capacity in order to accomplish this 
successfully? Both questions, as we shall see below, have an important 
bearing for articulating a grammar of social hope that provides 
structure for what we may say of God and of our human relation to 
God.  
 
Articulating and engaging Kant’s answer to these questions is 
complicated by the conflicting ways he seems to deal with the 
important prior question of whether it is inevitable that the divide that 
our reason encounters between nature and freedom gives rise to the 
distinctively moral fissure of “radical evil.” This question may be 
framed in terms that bear upon the “grammar of hope” that Kant’s 
account constructs in response to the “grammar of radical evil”: does 
Kant’s account of finite reason require that we say evil is necessary so 
that good may result? Conversely, to what extent does the hope that 
his account presents as authorized by the practical use of human finite 
reason provide a basis for saying evil is unnecessary? 
 
On one side, his discussion in “A Conjectural Beginning of 
Human History” (1786) recasts the Genesis account of the first human 
sin into a narrative of the awakening and maturing of human reason 
over against nature and of reason’s overcoming of the tutelage of 
natural instinct in order to make its own autonomous way through the 
world.20 In that account Kant seems to affirm that evil—or at least the 
human struggle with evil—functions as an engine of the development 
of human culture.21 There seems to be at least a historical and cultural 
inevitability to evil. In contrast, in part 3 of Religion (1793), evil enters 
the world in consequence of human engagement in a dynamics of 
emulation occasioned by social relations: it is a corruption of our 
finitude that we freely self-incur.22 In this later account Kant seems 
more hesitant to affirm evil as an inevitable outcome of the workings 
of finite human reason, as a necessary condition for a human moral 
progress conceived as an overcoming of nature. Religion affirms that, 
on the contrary, this self-incurred corruption is not an unavoidable 
conflict between nature and freedom as they intersect in the human. It 
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is, rather, an inner disordering within human reason that, even though 
occasioned by the circumstances of our human placement within 
nature, still has its fundamental root in and arises from an exercise of 
human finite reason that reorients an agent’s freedom toward the 
obduracy of self-preference. 
 
On Kant’s account, the radical evil that disorients and corrupts 
the human freedom that is governed by the practical use of human 
finite reason can be appropriately countered only by a reorientation 
brought about by the same finite reason that incurred the corruption. 
Yet the corruption finite reason has incurred places it so firmly in the 
grip of the obduracy of self-preference that it licenses us to speak of 
evil as a “natural propensity” so “woven” into human nature that it 
seems “inextirpable.”23 Within this condition of self-incurred 
corruption, breaking the grip of radical evil turns upon the possibility of 
reorienting human finite reason. For Kant such reorientation must be 
reason’s own doing, not an outcome brought about by an external 
agency: what freedom brought upon itself may only be undone in 
freedom. Envisioning the possibilities for exercising our finite reason as 
the agency that frees us from the grip of our obdurate self-preference 
thus constitutes the first horizon for human moral hope. Such hope 
thereby provides a “moral grammar” with which to articulate the 
possibility for reorientation from evil back to good. What it enables us 
to say is that radical evil is neither necessary nor inextirpable, even 
after it has been self-incurred. This provides the space of possibility 
within which we can then envision human finite reason having the 
power to turn away in freedom from the radical evil of obdurate self-
preference. 
 
There is more that this grammar of hope allows us to say with 
respect to the self-preferential obduracy that forms the fundamental 
dynamism of radical evil. The grammar of moral hope also provides 
the structure for a syntax of moral recognition that places constraint 
upon both explicit and implicit claims of self-preference; such syntax 
can be found in the “universal law” formulation of the categorical 
imperative, which places a veto on the self-preferential obduracy of 
individual moral agents.24 It is also operative in the discourse of 
mutual respect appropriate to membership and shared responsibility in 
what Kant terms “a kingdom of ends.” In this context, a syntax of 
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mortal recognition functions to clear a social space within which agents 
address not only questions of individual human interaction but also 
those dealing with the social governance of human life.25 On Kant’s 
account, a grammar of hope functions to break the grip of self-
preferential obduracy with respect both to the moral life of individual 
moral agents and to the structure and dynamics by which human 
agents mutually govern their social, political, and cultural interaction. 
 
In functioning to counter the grammar of self-preference 
licensed by radical evil, a Kantian grammar of hope thus creates a 
space of social possibility for full mutual respect for the exercise of 
human finite freedom, a space that Kant names “an ethical 
commonwealth.” The grammar of hope, moreover, not only structures 
a discourse of mutual respect for agents to engage one another in “the 
ethical commonwealth,” it also opens the possibility for speaking of 
God in ways that are morally appropriate to an anthropology of finite 
reason in which the vocation of humanity is completed in a social 
attainment of “the highest good.” This connection between a social 
space for mutual respect and a discourse about God is signaled by 
Kant’s placement of an explicit treatment of proper ways to speak of 
God morally at the conclusion of his account, in part 3 of Religion, of 
the establishment and the moral dynamics of the ethical 
commonwealth. This suggests that it is within the moral space of an 
ethical commonwealth that a grammar of hope most appropriately 
authorizes speaking of God as “moral ruler of the world.” Kant takes 
this expression to mark the primary mode of human 
religious/theological discourse, within which various aspects of such 
moral rule—holy lawgiver, benevolent ruler and moral guardian, just 
judge—may also be aptly spoken as morally true of God.26 
 
Two aspects of this discussion in Religion of the proper moral 
grammar for speaking of God are of particular note. The first is that 
this discourse continues to function under apophatic strictures that 
remind us that even this moral grammar speaks first of what God is 
not. What is said of God in such a moral grammar is not about the 
“nature” of God, which is cognitively inaccessible to finite reason; it 
bears, instead, primarily on the relation in which we, as moral beings, 
stand to God. It is not about “God as God” but about “God for us” 
morally.27 The second is that Kant views this relation as one in which 
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the primary operative dynamic, like that of the ethical commonwealth, 
is the moral one of mutual respect for freedom: a divine respect for 
human freedom that holds humanity morally accountable and a human 
respect for divine freedom that acknowledges that human finitude 
cannot comprehend the mode of that divine freedom’s enactment, 
save in terms of its steadfast respect for the exercise of human 
freedom. Kant seems well aware of Christian theology’s long-standing 
vocabulary and grammar of grace for speaking of this relationship, and 
part of his discussion includes his proposals for restructuring the 
grammar of terms such as “call,” “satisfaction,” and “election” along 
lines that both pay close attention to apophatic strictures and 
acknowledge the centrality of a mutually engaged respect for 
freedom.28 Even though we cannot know positively how that action of 
the divine that Christian theology speaks of as grace concretely works, 
we can affirm that it will not work in ways counter to the inmost 
dynamics of human finite freedom.  
 
This discussion in Religion provides a concrete instance of the 
working out of Kant’s famous claim cited earlier: “Thus I had to deny 
knowledge in order to make room for faith.”29 A denial of knowledge 
with respect to the workings of grace is for Kant crucial to the mutual 
respect for freedom that is central to Kant’s construal of the moral 
relation of the human to the divine. The hiddenness of God with 
respect to finite reason’s cognitive grasp of the moral working of the 
world is fundamental for the integrity of the finite freedom that 
constitutes the human.30 A proper human acknowledgment of God is 
one that issues from—and is most properly spoken by—a human 
freedom that is itself attentive to the respect for the moral order of 
human freedom with which the divine acts.31 In accord with this 
principle, Kant recognizes that the centerpiece of the Book of Job is 
not the vindication found in the restoration of Job’s prior prosperity, 
but in the divine commendation that Job had spoken rightly—that is, 
both with correct insight and with integrity—about the integrity of his 
own human finitude and about the inscrutable integrity of the workings 
of the divine.32 
 
In addition to structuring what we may say of “God for us” 
morally as a discourse of a mutual divine and human respect for 
freedom, a Kantian grammar of hope may also function to license a 
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form of speaking religiously with respect to human mutual interaction, 
that is, for articulating how human responsibility for the social shape 
and dynamics of their moral interaction bears upon humanity’s moral 
relation to God.33 Although Kant does not explicitly move his account 
in this direction, there are parallels between his discussions of the 
ethical commonwealth and of perpetual peace that suggest this 
possibility. These possibilities turn upon, first, Kant’s affirmation of 
both the ethical commonwealth and perpetual peace as socially 
formative for humanity’s attainment of its highest good, a task 
enjoined upon humanity as a categorical imperative; and, second, 
upon Kant’s further affirmation that attaining a full social unity and 
harmony of the concrete conditions that are needed to bring about the 
highest good seems beyond the capacity of human efforts alone.34 
From the perspective of our finite reason, the full attainment of either 
perpetual peace or an ethical commonwealth does not present itself to 
us as a matter of the theoretical certainty that comes with knowledge, 
but as a matter of the moral assurance that comes with hope. Kant 
sees such hope arising from our doing all that we must and can to 
bring about these moral ends—though we must do so in an apophatic 
mode that, even as it allows us to speak of that which finally brings 
such good about as “nature” or as “providence,” leaves in darkness 
both the “when” and the “how” of that final outcome. When we speak 
of that larger ordering principle as providence, it creates a space that 
enables us to speak of what we do for the attainment of this outcome 
as precisely a social good in terms that appropriately place it with 
respect to humanity’s relation to the divine. As I will suggest below, it 
allows us to speak of what we as humans do with one another to bring 
about peace as genuinely “godly” action. 
 
Kant’s clearest and most eloquent presentations of this dynamic 
of hope may well be on the concluding pages of the Rechtslehre, part 
1 of The Metaphysics of Morals: 
 
What is incumbent on us as a duty is rather to act in conformity 
with the idea of that end, even if there is not the slightest 
theoretical likelihood that it can be realized, as long as its 
impossibility cannot be demonstrated either. 
Now morally practical reason pronounces in us its 
irresistible veto: there is to be no war, neither war between you 
and me in the state of nature nor war between us as states . . . 
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for war is not the way in which everyone should seek his rights. 
So the question 
is no longer whether perpetual peace is something real or a 
fiction, and whether we are not deceiving ourselves in our 
theoretical judgments when we assume that it is real. Instead, 
we must act as if it is something real, though perhaps it is not; 
we must work toward establishing perpetual peace and the kind 
of constitution that seems to us most conducive to it (say, a 
republicanism of all states, together and separately) in order to 
bring about perpetual peace . . . And even if the complete 
realization of this objective always remains a pious wish, still we 
are certainly not deceiving ourselves in adopting the maxim of 
working incessantly toward it.35 
 
Kant does not expect humanity to wait around for nature or 
providence to bring about the peace that, in the absence of hope, we 
think we cannot. He rather takes it to be a human responsibility to 
move forward toward peace in view of that hope: hope licenses saying, 
in consequence of the imperative “there is to be no war,” that humans 
can and must find ways of social governance that will bring an end to 
war, even though it appears an impossible goal.36 A grammar of hope 
provides the moral discourse of human mutual respect with a syntax 
for envisioning possibilities—for saying “we can”—for the 
establishment of structures and conditions of social governance that 
befit our human condition of finite rationality. Hope expands the 
horizon of moral possibility for actions effecting peace. Within this 
space, the grammar of hope enables us, first, to speak of what ought 
to be done to make possible a state of enduring peace among peoples 
and, second, to affirm that such a state can only come about only to 
the extent that humanity acts on the hope that its efforts both are 
necessary and will be effective for bringing it about. 
 
How then does the hope that Kant thinks makes it possible for 
efforts to engage one another in effective cooperation for the securing 
of lasting peace also make it possible to speak of these efforts in terms 
that bear upon humanity’s relation to the divine? One answer to this 
may be found if we attend to the connection that Kant’s discussion of 
the ethical commonwealth in part 3 of Religion has to the social and 
political images that he uses in part 2 in his philosophical 
reconstruction of Christian teaching about how God effects human 
redemption in the person of “the Son of God.” Kant’s reconstruction 
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casts that teaching as a conflict between radical evil and the good 
principle which has rightful claim to moral dominion over human 
beings. Even though he voices significant objections to the language of 
vicarious satisfaction that an important stream of Christian theology 
uses to describe how the good principle triumphs, Kant affirms the 
language of freedom that theology has also used to present the 
redemptive activity of “the Son of God” as a liberation with social as 
well as personal effects:  
 
by exemplifying this principle (in the moral idea) that human 
being [Jesus] opened the doors of freedom to all who, like him, 
choose to die to everything that holds them fettered to earthly 
life to the detriment of morality; and among these he gathers 
unto himself “a people for his possession, zealous of good 
works” under his dominion, while he abandons to their fate all 
who prefer moral servitude.37 
 
While throughout his discussion Kant clearly avoids affirming the 
divinity of Jesus as it has been construed in Christian orthodoxy, he 
still uses the term “Son of God” in ways that indicate that he takes the 
gospel narratives of Jesus (whose name Kant does not employ) to 
offer a robust description of what it is for a human be “godly”—that is, 
to act morally as God acts morally. To the extent that Kant views the 
activity of redemption as socially ordered—i.e., that it serves the moral 
freedom not only of individual human agents, but also of humanity as 
a species—Jesus’s most “godly” activity was to make it possible for 
human beings to have the moral freedom to establish a social order in 
which they live with each other in ways that manifest full respect for 
one another’s freedom. In traditional theological terms, this most 
godly activity is exhibited in work humanity does in the establishment 
of “the Kingdom of God.” 
 
The close connection that Kant makes between the ethical 
commonwealth and the establishment of an international order for 
enduring peace—particularly in view of the intensity with which he 
proclaims the latter as a categorical imperative—suggests that human 
efforts to engage one another in effective cooperation for the securing 
of lasting peace constitute for Kant the way in which a finite humanity 
comes closest to being “godly” by doing what God does. A Kantian 
grammar of hope thus provides a way of speaking of the human moral 
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relation to God as one in which human beings can envision themselves 
as called and empowered to do as God does, as they work with one 
another for securing an order of enduring peace for humankind. In this 
way, Kant construes religious language to offer a grammar of hope 
that exhibits the articles of faith as meaningful for the lasting 
establishment of a community of mutual respect predicated upon the 
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25John Rawls’s device in A Theory of Justice of “the original position” in which 
(ideal) agents deliberate about the terms of their social governance 
captures an important dimension of the social space that is a function 
of a syntax of mutual recognition. 
26See Kant, RGV 6:139–42. 
27Kant, RGV 6:139: “This idea of a moral ruler of the work is a task for our 
practical reason. Our concern is not so much to know what he is in 
himself (his nature) but what he is for us as moral beings.” 
28Kant, RGV 6:142–43. 
29Kant, KrV Bxxx. 
30See also Neiman, Evil in Modern Thought, 327, “instead of knowledge of the 
future, God gave us hope. Kant turned this thought into one of his 
greater arguments: if we knew that God existed, freedom and virtue 
would disappear. It’s an act of Providence that the nature of 
Providence will forever remain uncertain.” 
31Neiman (Evil in Modern Thought, 77) observes that for Kant “God operates 
according to the same moral law as we do; He just never neglects to 
obey them.” 
32Immanuel Kant, MpVT 8:265–67. 
33There are ways in which Kant explicitly recognizes the bearing of moral 
action on this relation, for example, in his discussions of speaking of 
the moral law as “divine commands” in a way that recognizes that 
their moral force issues from the rightness of what they prescribe, not 
from their being commanded by God, and his distinction between 
considering actions in terms of how they make us worthy to be happy 
in contrast to how they produce happiness. These discussions, 
however, focus on the discourse of individual moral agency, rather 
than on the social discourse of hope that shapes Kant’s concern in 
texts such as Religion and “Perpetual Peace.” 
34Kant, RGV 6:97–98. 
35Immanuel Kant, MdS 6:354–55/490–91. 
36Kant presupposes that individual monarchs with sovereign power will be the 
agents for bringing about the form of international social governance 
he terms a “federation of free states” (Zum ewige Frieden 8:354). 
Transposing Kant’s account into terms pertinent to workings of political 
authority in representative democracies thus requires supplementing 
his account with one that attends to ways of engaging the agency of 
citizens in the establishment of these international forms of social 
governance. 
37Kant, RVG 6:82. 
 
